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Moscow's Push for a New European Order

An Intelligence Assessment

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
1999

CIASOV 90-10030X

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SOV 90-10030X
June 1990

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Moscow's Push for a New European Order

An Intelligence Assessment

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June 1990

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Moscow's Push for a New European Order

Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 5 June 1990
was used in this report.*

Faced with the prospect of a unified Germany and the demise of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, Moscow is promoting the integration of the USSR into the European economic and political system and the development of a new Pan-European security framework. The Soviets hope to build new mechanisms and institutions on the basis of the CSCE process to help the USSR maintain influence in European affairs and avoid becoming a marginal player in Europe. Indeed, there is a "now or never" quality to some Soviet statements on restructuring the European security order, suggesting that the Soviets believe that, whatever limited leverage they currently have, it will only decline further over the next decade.

The Soviets insist that for now the existing alliances are key elements of European stability and should provide the foundation on which a new security framework is constructed. They have stated that the alliances should be transformed into primarily political institutions and then ultimately be replaced by an all-European structure. Moscow is looking to this year's planned CSCE summit to initiate steps toward new political and security structures. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze has proposed that such mechanisms include regular CSCE summits, a foreign ministers' committee, a permanent secretariat, and risk-reduction and treaty-monitoring centers.

Shevardnadze also has called for the CSCE to evolve into a "full-fledged regional organization" that would monitor security-related developments and facilitate crisis resolution. The Soviets are soliciting related ideas from all quarters and have not ruled out several ambitious plans, including the deployment of a minor interbloc peacekeeping force or the creation of an all-European mutual defense pact.

Moscow's heightened interest in securing a commitment from the West to begin reshaping Europe's security framework almost certainly is motivated partly by the leadership's desire to be viewed at home as safeguarding Soviet security interests over the long term, regardless of whatever transitional German security arrangements it may have to accept. Soviet leaders have repeatedly called at the highest levels for the "synchronization" of decisions on German security issues during the transformation of the alliances and the creation of a new European security structure. While we judge that the Soviets ultimately will concede to some form of NATO affiliation for Germany, it is clear that President Gorbachev will need to be able to demonstrate that he has fashioned a compromise that appears to

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protect basic Soviet security interests. The Soviets may push for a Western commitment ranging from agreement to create modest new institutions and mechanisms to specific promises of concrete steps toward a wholly new structure in the concluding document of the CSCE summit.

Although the Soviets almost certainly are aware that the CSCE represents a fairly weak foundation for the common European home and is limited in its ability to provide concrete security guarantees, they appear committed to building a new political, economic, and security framework on that process. Their willingness to base any part of their long-term security plans on the development of a Pan-European structure reflects the extent to which they are relying less on raw military power and becoming more sensitive to the importance of economic strength and political acumen. Nonetheless, they will retain robust military forces to protect their security interests and probably will seek to establish bilateral and possibly sub-regional security relationships to ameliorate some of the effects of the Pact's eventual dissolution.

The Soviets have proclaimed their desire for a continuing US role in a new European order, but their vision of a new Europe cuts at the very heart of NATO's *raison d'être*; it would reduce US influence by entangling Washington's security input in an unwieldy 35-nation process. On the other hand, the Soviets and many Europeans are hoping that an all-European collective political and security system might fill the void left by the Warsaw Pact, provide a framework for managing ethnic and nationalist tensions in Eastern Europe, and help ward off a Soviet drift into dour isolationism. The West Europeans want to help their East European neighbors emerge peacefully from 40 years of Stalinism and to promote economic restructuring and political pluralism in the USSR. Indeed, influential West European voices have already called for a process of integration that *includes* rather than *excludes* the East.

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Moscow's Push for a New European Order

Introduction

Europe has become President Gorbachev's greatest foreign policy challenge to date. Events there have forced him to deal concurrently with the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, imminent German unification, the prospect of a united Germany in NATO, and the challenge of West European economic integration. While Soviet writings on the "common European home" (see inset) foresaw some of these changes, they presumed a 10- to 20-year time frame in which the toughest issue—German unification—would be resolved late in the process.

The major geopolitical shifts in Europe also have complicated Gorbachev's domestic agenda. Clearly, he had no intention of dealing with the German question at the exact moment he was moving to introduce radical economic reforms, a multiparty political system, and concurrently faced the break-away of independence-minded republics like Lithuania. His foreign policy record, up to now largely unchallenged, has elicited charges from hardline critics that Soviet security interests have been compromised by his policies in Eastern Europe, especially in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). And his economic game plan, which depends heavily on technological assistance from Western Europe and the United States, hinges on continued positive change in the USSR and could be jeopardized by any hardline shifts.

Gorbachev's biggest near-term concern is the thorny problem of a united Germany's security relations with NATO. As Moscow engages in the two-plus-four discussions and the related summit of the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), it faces the dilemma of wanting a unified Germany to be constrained by Europe, but not militarily tied to NATO.¹ Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze have strongly objected to NATO's

¹ In mid-February, the two Germanys agreed with the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union to hold negotiations over the external aspects of German unification called the two-plus-four talks.

The Conceptual Framework: A Common European Home

Since the mid-1980s, the main theme of Gorbachev's policy toward Europe has been his call for a common European home. The concept has been articulated best by Europe Institute Director Vitaliy Zhurkin, who defined it in May 1989 as "a new system of security and cooperation stemming from and prolonging the all-European process" that would be based on the "gradual elimination of the military-political and economic split in Europe." This split would be replaced by "effective and mutually advantageous forms of coexistence among states with different social systems."

The Soviets have described the building of a common European home as a multistage process during which Pan-European integration would become progressively institutionalized, but only over more than a decade. Writing in May 1989, Zhurkin envisioned the development of a system of cooperation among states under a "supranational organization" as occurring during the initial decades of the 21st century, after years of arms reduction, development of economic and humanitarian cooperation, and growth of mutual trust.

Moreover, although the idea of a common European home has been a centerpiece of Gorbachev's policy for several years, it is still only a skeleton of a concept. Gorbachev admitted last July in a landmark address to the Council of Europe that "even today I do not claim that I have in my pocket a completed design" for the common European home. Andrei Kortunov, a prominent and fast-rising official at the United States and Canada Institute, observed in a late-December New Times article that the concept of the common European home has, up to now, served well as an ideal, but is "clearly inadequate as a practical policy."

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becoming the only long-term guarantor of European security, arguing that NATO membership for a unified Germany would irreparably upset the balance of power in Europe, no matter what special provisions are made to keep NATO troops out of, or some Soviet troops in, the Eastern part. A number of Soviet officials and academics argue that such a move is politically untenable, even some who downplay the potential military threat posed by a unified Germany's inclusion in NATO. In this regard:

• [redacted] told [redacted] in February that the view that the GDR was a bastion against the imperialist menace had been drilled into the Soviet people for 45 years; they simply could not accept overnight that their government should connive at the GDR becoming part of a German state within NATO.

- Gorbachev told [redacted] in mid-April that the Supreme Soviet would not agree to German membership in NATO [redacted]

We assess that Gorbachev ultimately will be able to manage his domestic constituency on this issue.² Moreover, Moscow recognizes that its leverage is limited and that it has a strong interest in securing good relations with a unified Germany. We judge, therefore, that the Soviets ultimately will concede to transitional arrangements that permit some form of NATO affiliation for Germany. Nonetheless, it is apparent that Gorbachev will need to be able to demonstrate that he has fashioned a compromise that protects Soviet security interests over the long term. Thus, Moscow almost certainly will insist that any security arrangement involving NATO membership constitute only one phase in a long-term transformation of the security situation in Europe and that mechanisms be established to effect such a transformation.

• [redacted]

² For a discussion of how Moscow hopes to manage the near-term transition to German unity, see DI Intelligence Assessment SOV 90-10014 [redacted] March 1990, *USSR: Developing a Game Plan for Six-Power Meetings on German Unification*.

There is a shared East and West European interest in constraining both the economic and military potential of a strong, unified German state. Indeed, imminent unification is focusing the attention of Europeans on the need to make some fundamental decisions about their long-term security, attention that Moscow hopes to channel and adapt in the direction of the institutions and mechanisms it has proposed as the basis for the common European home. Moreover, the West Europeans want to help their East European neighbors emerge peacefully from 40 years of Stalinism and to promote economic restructuring and political pluralism in the USSR. Indeed, influential West European voices have already called for a process of integration that *includes* rather than *excludes* the East. For example, in discussions with [redacted]

• West German Foreign Minister Genscher argued forcefully that, as the Warsaw Pact and CEMA disintegrate, the Soviets need something new to use as a framework for their inclusion and integration in Europe. He warned that Europe should not return to its prewar balkanization.

Faced with a unified Germany and the impending marginalization of the USSR, Moscow hopes to capitalize on the potential receptivity in Europe to the creation of new security structures by resolving key German security issues among the major powers and moving the all-European process at a pace that is more in line with the rapidity of change in Europe. There is a "now or never" quality to some Soviet statements, suggesting that the Soviets believe that whatever limited leverage they currently have, it will only decline further over the next decade:

- An influential [redacted] arms control expert [redacted] stressed that the current environment provided some opportunities to [redacted]

* There are strong sentiments among leading members of several ruling parties in Western Europe—such as France, Italy, and Belgium—for progress toward a new all-European structure [redacted]

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speed European integration that may be fleeting, according to []

- A [] diplomat confided that Moscow is determined, even desperate, that this year's CSCE summit begin the process of European reconciliation and create the instruments and institutions to speed up the process of European integration. []

These and numerous other remarks by Soviet leaders, midlevel officials, and prominent commentators make it clear that, whatever transitional arrangements the Soviets envision for the early 1990s, they want to make real progress toward a comprehensive restructuring of the European architecture.

Looking to the CSCE Process

I am all the time trying to comprehend what "Pan-European process" means

Influential commentator Aleksandr Bovin

The Soviets have indicated their desire to accelerate integration and the development of a new Pan-European security structure, but they have offered very few details about any future structure. There are clear signs that they are working to move the common European home—especially its security component—off the drawing board, but, as yet, it remains in the drafting stage.

Nonetheless, the Soviets have been explicit about their desire to base the new architecture on the CSCE process. Moscow has selected the CSCE not only because it is a readymade forum, but also, more important, because it would provide the Soviets a legitimate and continuing entree into European affairs and help prevent the USSR from becoming a marginal actor on the European stage. Unlike organizations such as the Council of Europe in which Moscow and its allies do not have membership, the CSCE is a forum that would guarantee them the opportunity to press their own economic and security interests and initiatives. Its rule by consensus and its traditional emphasis on the sanctity of borders are

A New Concept of Security

That the Soviets would consider basing any part of their long-term security plans on the development of a Pan-European structure reflects the extent to which basic Soviet concepts of national security have changed. Rather than raw military power, "new thinking" views economic strength as the key source of long-term security and political acumen as the main tool for achieving foreign policy success.

This view is buttressed by the apparent realization that NATO does not represent the degree of threat highlighted by Gorbachev's predecessors. Along these lines, Shevardnadze told a []

[] that Gorbachev no longer views NATO or the United States as a genuine threat to the Soviet Union. []

[] While this view of the West is not unanimous in the Soviet hierarchy, especially among the military, it clearly has been an important factor in development of Gorbachev's basic approach toward arms control, East-West political contacts, and the nurturing of foreign economic relationships.

consistent with Moscow's interests. Moreover, in consonance with Soviet "new thinking" about how to achieve lasting security, the CSCE process emphasizes the political and economic over the military aspects of security (see inset)

At the same time, the Soviets know that the CSCE also leaves the door open to a continued US political presence. In fact, the Soviets have gone to some lengths recently to assert that their vision of a new Europe with a unified Germany includes, and may even depend on, a stabilizing role for the United States. The United States and Canada Institute's Kortunov insisted in late February that, for the time being, both the USSR and the United States cannot give up responsibility for stability in Europe and internationally

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The Soviets also see the CSCE process as having the best potential to constrain Germany over the long term. They believe that the most reliable protection against future German militarization would come from a continuation and deepening of a united Germany's integration with the rest of Europe. Economically, this means a state whose prosperity depends on strong links to the rest of Europe. From a political and legal standpoint, the Soviets appear to be counting on the combined weight of European interests, marshaled in some sort of CSCE-based institutional structure, to keep Germany in its place. The Soviets appear to believe that such an institution would be greater than the sum of its parts, if only through its ability to exert moral suasion:

- Speaking to the Canadian Parliament about the German question in February, Shevardnadze called the 35 CSCE states "a great force," whose participation in the integration of Europe is the "one insurance mechanism on which we can rely in the matter of maintaining European stability."
- Sergey Karaganov, Deputy Director of the Academy of Science's Europe Institute, recently argued for the involvement of many countries because these "multiple, though sometimes small, countries have a say in European affairs, and they could create some kind of a corset which could direct their development." He called on the West and East to work together to create a "web of constraints" on Germany.

While the Soviets see many advantages to the CSCE process, they undoubtedly are aware of its principal drawback—it is an unwieldy body of diverse and, in many cases, highly competitive states that has had great difficulty achieving agreement in the past. So far, it has served a relatively modest role as a consensus-building process, not a working bureaucracy. It has worked best as a means to mandate work on specific issues, like the talks on confidence-building measures in Europe. The Soviets almost certainly are aware that the CSCE represents a fairly weak foundation for the common European home and is limited in its ability to provide concrete security guarantees, but they nonetheless appear committed to building a new political, economic, and security framework on that process.

Institutionalizing the CSCE

In speeches, interviews, and articles by Shevardnadze and in various multilateral diplomatic forums, the Soviets have expressed interest in several ideas for new CSCE-based mechanisms or structures that would lead to or serve as the basis for a new European architecture. Soviet goals appear to be to create structures that would promote dialogue, facilitate crisis prevention or resolution, and encourage and monitor arms control agreements. The Soviets have called for the early introduction of several mechanisms to facilitate the process of CSCE institutionalization. They include:

- A "Greater European Council" made up of the leaders of the 35 nations that would meet every two years. The role of chairman and host would rotate, and a coordinating body would be set up consisting of the preceding, current, and subsequent Council chairmen.
- A committee of foreign ministers that would meet once or twice a year to advance the CSCE process.
- A "troika" of past, present, and future chairmen for both the leadership and foreign ministers bodies to respond to urgent situations through collective action.
- "Coordinating Commission" that would serve the foreign ministers committee from a permanent seat in a major city. It would be composed of the 35 member state's ambassadors to the host country and would be supported by a permanent secretariat that would prepare meetings and develop proposals for additional institutions.

In addition, they have proposed several bodies that would have specific political, legal, scientific, or ecological functions, including:

- A consultative assembly of legislators.
- An institute of comparative law.
- A human rights institute.
- An environmental council.
- Organs for ecological assistance.

They have stressed that such institutions should draw on the experience of existing Pan-European institutions, like the Council of Europe.

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Presumably, these specialized institutions would eventually fall under the bureaucratic control of an umbrella organization. Perhaps the grandest proposal that the Soviets have backed is a recent offer by Polish Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki to host a permanent CSCE-based Council for European Cooperation. The Poles have been vague about its precise function, but they envision it coordinating a number of overall European agencies and other "integrational communities."

Casting About for a Security Structure

Although a new security structure is the most important component of Moscow's vision of a new Europe, there have been few concrete proposals to flesh it out. The only concrete proposals involve the creation of a Center for Averting the Danger of War—not a new idea—that would monitor potential trouble spots in Europe and make recommendations to the foreign ministers committee and a center to share information on military activities and to coordinate inspections and other verification activities. Shevardnadze has suggested that such a new CSCE center could evolve out of the current Four-Power Military Liaison Mission structure and be housed with the Berlin Air Safety Center in the former Control Council building.

Beyond these proposals, it is clear the Soviets have far more ambitious, though currently less well-defined, plans for a new security structure. In a mid-April draft of an article scheduled to be published in the May 1990 edition of the journal *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, Shevardnadze wrote that the CSCE process should evolve into a "full-fledged regional organization" that would act as provided for in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter to settle conflicts and disputes among nations.³ Shevardnadze said this organization would "negotiate, monitor, evaluate, and correct" security-related problems.

Most significant, Shevardnadze called the idea of giving "certain peacekeeping functions" to a CSCE body "sensible" and noted that the need for some

³ Chapter VIII of the UN Charter provides for the creation of "regional arrangements or agencies" to maintain international peace and security. The provision calls on the UN Security Council to "utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action," although it enjoins such bodies from taking such action without the authorization of the Security Council.

"minor interbloc peacekeeping force is not to be ruled out." Shevardnadze wrote that there is a need for a regional body that is more flexible and less remote than the United Nations to perform mediation and peacekeeping in Europe. He indicated that the new structure, like the current CSCE process, should continue the practice of agreement by consensus—rather than majority vote. Except for the idea of a "troika" of leaders or foreign ministers that could act in a crisis, however, the Soviets have said nothing about how they plan to achieve consensus among 35 diverse nations.

As for the schedule for developing such a new structure, only Valentin Falin, Chief of the Central Committee's International Department and a long-time Germanist, has laid out any details. According to [] reporting on a late-March speech to the Western European Union, Falin said the first phase would be a transition away from postwar structures that would take three to five years and be based on technical disarmament negotiations. The second phase, involving the setting up of new European security structures, would last until the beginning of the next century. Nonetheless, Falin argued that steps should be taken soon to initiate a process leading to a new structure.

Other Ideas

The Soviets clearly are soliciting ideas from all quarters for ways to move forward with the development of a new European architecture, and they have supported, encouraged, or expressed interest in a variety of proposals being promoted around Europe. For example, [] Shevardnadze and Gorbachev's military adviser, Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, expressed unusually strong interest in a plan for a reworked security system based on the CSCE that was presented recently by West German Social Democratic security expert Egon Bahr. (Bahr was invited to return to Moscow in mid-April to discuss his plan further.) The new system, toward which Bahr envisions real movement by 1992, would bind the German defense structure into a Pan-European security system. He also said it would encompass all European militaries, but it is not clear from available evidence what he has in mind in this regard.

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The Soviets have publicly expressed interest in several other ideas as useful contributions to the search for a new security structure, including a plan proposed in mid-March by Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier at the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers meeting. The plan, which Prague subsequently proposed formally to all of the CSCE participating states, calls for a three-stage process leading to a European confederation. Dienstbier has said that the "core" of this system would be a treaty committing every party to provide aid—including military aid—to any participant in the system in the event of an attack, and he called for a "mechanism enabling the implementation of this commitment" called a European Security Commission. The commission would:

- Operate in parallel with an Economic Commission for Europe.
 - Facilitate the peaceful settlement of disputes, information sharing, and treaty monitoring.
 - Consist of a political chamber of foreign ministers and a subordinated military chamber.
 - Include a commission of experts and a secretariat.
- The establishment of a European Security Commission, which would operate concurrently with the two alliances, would constitute the first stage of the Czechoslovak plan. Stage two would involve the creation of an organization of European states, including the United States and Canada. The third stage would culminate in an as yet undefined confederated Europe. It is unclear what roles the United States and the USSR would play in the last stage of the Czechoslovak plan.

Moscow's Tactical Approach

While busy drafting a new architecture, the Soviets are engaged in a vigorous effort to manage resolution of the external security aspects of German unification while trying to channel the Pan-European process into a concrete dialogue on security issues. They have repeatedly called at the highest levels for the "synchronization" of decisions on German security issues during the transformation of the alliances and the creation of a new European security structure. Statements by senior Soviet leaders indicate a near

obsession with the concept of synchronization, which indicates that they see few other palatable alternatives. Thus, they have instituted a diplomatic full-court press to try to bring the two processes into line.

The Soviet-proposed CSCE summit anticipated for late this year is a key element of Moscow's strategy for eventually replacing the bloc system with a Pan-European architecture. To try to capitalize on current opportunities, a major diplomatic effort is under way to solicit and promote ideas with East and West Europeans. Over the past few months, the Soviets have discussed the creation of a new architecture throughout Europe:

- On the opening day of the recent US-Soviet summit in Washington, Shevardnadze delivered a letter to the CSCE member states laying out Moscow's ideas for institutionalizing the CSCE.
- Earlier, Moscow had sent a team of Foreign Ministry officials to European and North American capitals to work out plans for the CSCE summit.

—] indicates that the Soviets proposed to achieve consensus on a security framework at the summit.

- In recent months, [] have discussed the creation of new security structures or the general development of the Pan-European process with representatives of a number of European countries and parties, including France, West and East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg.
- In addition to the foreign ministers meeting on 18 March, two meetings of the Warsaw Pact's Mutual Information Group were held—in January and March—to focus on the CSCE's future role in European security.

The Soviets certainly do not expect a new European architecture to emerge full-blown this year. Soviet officials in Moscow made clear to []

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The Role of the Conventional Forces in Europe Talks

The Soviets apparently hope that the 23-nation CFE negotiations in Vienna will result in at least an appearance of symmetry and balance of power in Europe and that, for the next few years, they will help legitimize a continuing Soviet and US presence in Central Europe. While they technically will establish ceilings and not floors for stationed forces, Soviet CFE Ambassador Grinevskiy told a

[] that CFE negotiations would serve the purpose of replacing postwar Four-Power arrangements with a new legal basis for maintaining US and Soviet troops in Germany []

The Soviets are aware, however, that no matter what they say about the continuing need for, and long-term viability of, the Warsaw Pact, any Soviet military presence in Europe is temporary and their military alliance is moribund. Undoubtedly, no small part of the Soviet strategy for replacing the old alliances with a wholly new structure is a desire to force the alteration of NATO's character. CFE negotiations are a critical part of Moscow's plan for developing a suitable transition between the current stage and the emergence of a new security structure. The Soviets know that a unified Germany will not tolerate—much less fund—Soviet stationed forces for more than a few years. Therefore, they will turn to the CFE process, probably CFE II, to try to secure reciprocity from the West as they reduce and withdraw their forces

[] that these officials know that new structures cannot be established overnight, and other spokesmen have predicted a fairly lengthy period of gestation lasting through the 1990s. It is clear, however, that the Soviets intend to make a major push toward at least initiating and securing commitments to move toward a new political and security structure at the CSCE gathering. While acknowledging that development of new structures will be a lengthy process that will stretch through this year's CSCE summit and the long-scheduled Helsinki meeting in 1992, Shevardnadze wrote in NATO's Sixteen Nations that the

institutionalization of CSCE should receive "immediate attention." He has stated that the development of new European structures should be a priority issue at the CSCE gathering.

The Soviets hope to secure agreement to their proposals for regular summits, a foreign ministers committee, and some kind of permanent secretariat. Shevardnadze has called these the "minimum set of political mechanisms that are necessary." The Soviets also appear to assign great importance to laying out basic goals in a concluding document. In a late-February *Izvestiya* interview, Shevardnadze said that the signing of a concluding document, even if only some questions had been addressed, would be a "major step of worldwide significance." He and Conventional Forces in Europe Ambassador Grinevskiy have stated that they want the final document to:

- Confirm and expand on the Helsinki Final Act in a "politically significant way."
- Register agreement to transform the blocs into political structures.
- Declare the end of World War II and the overcoming of the division of Europe.
- Codify existing borders.
- Endorse "reasonable sufficiency."
- Endorse each nation's right to free elections.
- Set a date and mechanism for the 1992 CSCE summit.

Of these proposals, the effort to obtain a formal commitment to the transformation of the blocs appears to have the most far-reaching implications for NATO. While proclaiming a stabilizing role for the alliances and its desire to keep them intact for now, Moscow has reinvigorated its proposal for NATO and the Pact to change from military to political structures. In recent months, Soviet leaders have infused this idea with a current theme, claiming that transformation of the alliances would greatly facilitate German unification.

Outlook

It is clear that the Soviets hope to come away from the CSCE summit able to declare significant movement toward the comprehensive restructuring of the

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European security framework. At present, they appear to be interested mainly in securing basic commitments in a peace treaty or, because the Germans are resistant to a treaty, in a final document of the conference. But there are clear indications that the Soviets also are reviewing options for more concrete ideas—such as some kind of collective security arrangement—and could present some significant proposals between now and the CSCE summit. They may view the two-plus-four talks on German unification as an appropriate forum to raise these issues.

At the same time, the Soviets have gone to considerable lengths to explain that their plans to overcome the division of Europe do not mean the alliances should disappear soon. Rather, they have insisted that NATO and the Warsaw Pact provide the foundation on which a new structure should be built. Shevardnadze wrote for *NATO's Sixteen Nations* that "paradoxically," although the two alliances are based on confrontation, "a new all-European structure can only result from the evolution of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization; more than that, it is only they which can construct it." He called for the development of strong interalliance ties, including the establishment of permanent, direct links between their respective governing bodies through the establishment of a joint consultative and coordination structure.

It is unclear how vigorously the Soviets will try to weave the development of the CSCE process into any compromise over Germany's future security status, despite the fact that they have stressed that movement toward a new security structure is critical to the successful resolution of the external security aspects of German unification. Their current rhetoric suggests they view some kind of Western commitment to eventually abandon the alliance system in favor of an all-European structure as necessary cover for any deal they might strike over Germany's affiliation with NATO during a transition period. There is little hard evidence, however, on how strong a commitment they require. Such a commitment could range from agreement to create modest institutions to specific statements promising concrete steps toward a new structure in a final CSCE summit document.

The Soviets' vision of a Pan-European political, economic, and security architecture is consistent with their new concept of national security. They hope such a structure would strengthen political and economic integration while lowering the level of military confrontation. Moreover, in recent years, Moscow has reevaluated some of its objective military security requirements. The Soviets appear to be placing greater emphasis than in the past on reducing uncertainty and enhancing their ability to measure intentions. To that end, they are striving for a Pan-European structure that would foster a transparent security environment and facilitate confidence building.

It should be noted that the Soviets have no intention of abandoning all military means for safeguarding their interests. They clearly intend to maintain robust forces and probably will seek to establish bilateral and possibly subregional security relationships to ameliorate some of the effects of the Pact's eventual dissolution. Moreover, they probably would not be willing to subordinate more than a few military units—for limited peacekeeping functions only—to any new structure, and almost certainly do not envision the establishment of anything like the military command structures of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, even in the event that the CSCE states agree to a mutual defense pact.

Implications for the United States

Soviet steps to mold Pan-European integration are raising basic questions about how far, how fast, and in what forum the European security system should be transformed, as well as the respective US and Soviet roles in a new structure. Although the Soviets have proclaimed their desire for a continuing US role in a new European order, the creation of a new Pan-European forum, nonetheless, would present major challenges to the United States' ability to maintain its current level of influence on the Continent. In the near term, the United States must contend with initiatives designed to put the Pan-European process on a fast track.

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